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Abstract 
With the occurrence of natural disasters on the increase, major cities 
around the world face the potential of complete loss of infrastructure due 
to design guidelines that do not consider resilience in the design. With the 
February 22nd, 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, being the largest insured 
event, lessons learnt from the rebuild will be vital for the preparation of 
future disasters.  
 
Therefore the objective of this research is to understand the financial 
implications of the changes to the waste water design guidelines used 
throughout the five year rebuild programme of works. The research 
includes a study of the SCIRT alliance model selected for the delivery 
that is flexible enough to handle changes in the design with minimal 
impact on the direct cost of the rebuild works. The study further includes 
the analysis and compares the impact of the three different guidelines on 
maintenance and replacement cost over the waste water pipe asset life.  
The research concludes that with the varying ground conditions in 
Christchurch and also the wide variety of materials in use in the waste 
water network up to the start of the CES, the rebuild was not a ‘one size 
fits all’ approach.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction to study 
Background 
Natural disasters around the world are increasing and according to the 
United Nations, during the 10 years from 1992 until 2012, 4.4 billion 
people were impacted, USD 2 trillion of damage occurred and 1.3 million 
people were killed as a result of natural disasters (United Nations Office 
for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015). It is becoming more important for 
funding organisations such as insurers, local councils, central 
governments and transport organisations to accurately understand the 
cost of repair to infrastructure. Accurate costing requires not only 
knowledge of the cost of initial repairs but also of the repercussions of 
the chosen repair methodology on future maintenance costs. Structural 
solutions may be more expensive than ‘quick fixes’ but seen over a 
longer term they may still be the better choice. Funders could be mostly 
concerned with the initial repair expenditures. The asset owners may 
need to have a more long term view, balancing capital and operational 
expenditure (Pelling, Ozerdem, & Barakat, 2002).  
 
Literature review 
New Zealand is located on the boundary of the Australian and Pacific 
tectonic plates and experiences about 30 earthquakes a year of magnitude 
greater than 6. Most of these earthquakes are centred on the tectonic 
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boundary along the east coast of the north island and the west coast of the 
south island. Christchurch is New Zealand’s second largest city and the 
largest on the south island. The Canterbury plains experience about 1-
2mm of movement per year as a result of the collision of the two plates. 
Christchurch was considered a moderate seismic zone in a country with 
high seismic activity because historically the earthquakes affecting 
Christchurch were as a result of distant faults (Kenneth, et al., 2014) 
 
Since the start of the CES in September 2010, Christchurch has recorded 
12,778 earthquakes in and around the region. During this period the most 
significant earthquakes included the Mw 7.1 on the 4th of September 
2010, the Mw 6.2 on the 22nd of February 2011, Mw 5.6 and Mw 5.6 
separated by 80 minutes on the 13th of June 2011 and the Mw 5.8 and 
Mw 5.9 separated by 80 minutes on the 23rd of December 2011 
(Nicholls, n.d.). During the February 22, 2011 earthquake, 185 lives were 
lost in Christchurch as buildings collapsed along with thousands of 
homes being extensively damaged.  
 
The city also suffered significant damage to its vital infrastructure many 
inner city businesses were disrupted for a prolonged period as the CBD 
was cordoned off to allow demolition of critically damaged buildings to 
proceed. The land damage suffered in Christchurch was particularly 
unique; nowhere else in the world had liquefaction been repeatedly 
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experienced across such a great expanse (van Ballegooy, et al., February 
2014). In Christchurch most of the liquefaction occurred in the eastern 
suburbs, where nearly 400,000 tonnes of silt mixed with waste water and 
caused a significant health risk (Heiler, Moore, & Gibson, 2012).  
 
The total cost of damage is estimated to be around 10% of New 
Zealand’s GDP (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012) and the Christchurch 
earthquake is ranked as one of the most expensive natural disasters since 
1950 (Doherty, 2011). 
 
Disaster recovery projects are comparable with major infrastructure 
projects (Koria, 2009) and to date major infrastructure projects have a 
history for incurring cost overruns, which are often due to ineffective risk 
management and the lack of accountability (Flyvberg, Bruzeluis, & 
Rothengatter, 2003).Alliance contracting is used as a procurement model 
where organizations work collaboratively by sharing responsibility and 
risk (Eriksson, 2010). The risk associated with the unknown scope of 
works (Eriksson, 2010), the urgency to reinstate damaged infrastructure 
post disaster as quickly as possible (Koria, 2009) and the risk of further 
seismic activities made an alliance an ideal procurement model. 
 
Horizontal infrastructure, due to its often linear extent, can be vulnerable 
to geological hazards and is therefore at an increased risk of suffering 
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damage in a natural disaster. (Free, Anderson, Milloy, & Milian, 2006). 
This loss of infrastructure causes a significant impact on the 
physiological and economic impact on communities. The reconstruction 
of these projects should aim to reduce the vulnerability of societies 
through building back better infrastructure (Palliyaguru & Dilanthi, 
Managing disaster risks through quality infrastructure and vice versa, 
2008). A lack of resilience in infrastructure could lead to ongoing 
disruptions, poor recovery following a disaster and also increases the 
likelihood of permanent loss of the infrastructure (Hudson, Cormie, 
Tufton, & Inglis, 2012).  
 
Due to the diverse range of topics covered in this research more detailed 
literature reviews are included in chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
 
Aim and objectives 
During the rebuild programme of Christchurch’s horizontal 
infrastructure, three different design guidelines were used for designing 
the repairs to the waste water network. These design guidelines were 
refined throughout the duration of the rebuild the repair works moved 
from the worst affected eastern suburbs to the lesser damaged western 
suburbs. The initial design guideline was based on number of breakages 
in pipes and lead to the replacement of entire pipe lengths if a certain 
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number of breakages occurred. This was followed by a level of service 
approach. The subsequent guideline looked at deferring repairs to 
damaged pipes with at least 15 years of remaining asset life (Heiler, 
Moore, & Gibson, 2012). The final design guideline allowed for an asset 
to be repaired using a value approach. 
 
The main aim of this research is to evaluate what the implications were 
on the asset life using each of the three design guidelines for asset 
owners. With the value of the waste water repair works estimated to be 
65% of the $2,2 Billion infrastructure rebuild programme, this will be the 
main focus. The main objectives therefore are: 
 
• Evaluate the financial performance of the SCIRT alliance model 
• Develop a method to compare the RUL for each of the design 
guides 
• Discuss the comparison of the remaining asset life of each design 
guide 
• Give recommendations concerning design guidelines post 
disaster. 
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Methodology 
The infrastructure rebuild programme in Christchurch has been selected 
for a case study because an alliance form of contracting has to date not 
being used for disaster recovery projects. According to Yin it is 
acceptable to use a single case study for research (Yin). The methodology 
used for the research includes a qualitative analyses of the alliance model 
and the design guidelines used during the rebuild.  It also include 
quantitative analyses of the financial performance of projects delivered 
during the rebuild programme of works as well as the financial 
implication of the three design guidelines used. 
 
Lessons learned from the horizontal infrastructure rebuild programme in 
Christchurch will be used as a case study for the financial impact of 
different design guidelines for the design of the repairs of waste water 
network. This is in line with the objectives of the World Conference on 
Disaster Risk Reduction in 2005 and will assist with decision making for 
future disaster risk reduction (United Nations, 2005).  
 
Research structure 
This thesis includes three chapters been used as the basis for journal 
articles covering the objectives of the research. A brief summary of the 
chapters is as follows: 
7 | P a g e  
 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the alliance procurement model used to deliver the 
rebuild works. This chapter concludes that this multi-client multi-
contractor alliance is different to more commonly used “classes” of 
alliances, in the procurement of design services, the introduction of a 
DPS to provide price tension between the NOPs that ensures value for 
money for the client organisations, while the gain/pain incentive ensures 
collaboration across the delivery teams. It also has an independent TOC 
development with no price influence from the delivery teams. 
 
Chapter 3 analysed 288 projects constructed during the SCIRT rebuild 
with varying levels of ECI input. The financial performance of projects 
undertaken across the alliance programme with varying levels of ECI 
input indicates that there is a significant improvement in cost 
performance and cost accuracy of TOC projects with ECI input, whether 
informal or documented. 
 
Chapter 4 evaluates the 3 design guidelines. The chapter discusses how 
the repair works varied from completely rebuilding the network in some 
parts to other parts where no or little amount of repairs are required as the 
existing network provides varying levels of resistance to the natural 
disaster. 
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Chapter 5 evaluates the application of the design guidelines across the 
city and in particular in relation to land damage caused by liquefaction.  
 
Chapter 6 compares the financial implications of the 3 design guidelines 
used during the rebuild on the indirect cost of the waste water network. 
Depending on the design criteria for determining earthquake damage, the 
financial implication of the rebuild could have significant implications 
for the asset owners in terms of RUL and maintenance cost over the life 
of the asset. 
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Chapter 2 Christchurch rebuild, New Zealand: alliancing with 
a difference 
 
Botha P.S, Scheepbouwer E, Christchurch rebuild, New Zealand: 
alliancing with a difference. 
Proceedings of the Institute of Civil Engineers Management, 
Procurement and Law volume 168 June 2015 Issue MP3 Pages 121-129 
 
Introduction 
Immediately following the September 2010 earthquake a programme of 
works managed by the local City Council was established to repair the 
broken infrastructure. This programme was referred to as IRMO. In 
effect, the city was sub-divided into four geographical areas called 
“pods” each being allocated to a reputable national construction company 
who in turn engaged a design consultant to provide the necessary 
professional services. The programme worked well and provided an 
instant response for what now could be described as a modest amount of 
earthquake damage. The SCIRT alliance was subsequently formed to 
deliver the programme of works for the rebuilding of Christchurch’s 
horizontal infrastructure. The horizontal infrastructure to be repaired by 
SCIRT includes the water supply reticulation and reservoirs, waste water 
reticulation and pump stations, storm water reticulation and pump 
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stations, roading networks for both Local Council and National Roads 
Agency include bridge repairs and retaining walls. These networks are 
commonly referred to as asset types in the SCIRT rebuild programme.  
 
In addition to being able to incorporate a substantial portion of IRMO 
projects either in construction or well advanced in the design the model 
had to effectively manage the high risk associated with the unknown 
scope of work involved in disaster recovery projects, the pressures on 
schedule performance, co-ordination of resources and a need to have 
access to ECI during the detailed design phase to reduce risk by 
providing constructability input. (Song, Mohamed, & AbouRizk, 2006) 
This made alliancing an ideal procurement model (Department of 
Treasury and Finance, 2006) , (Eriksson, 2010).  
 
SCIRT has been setup as a multi-client, multi-contractor alliance to 
deliver the programme of works associated with the rebuild. The 
programme of works is made up in a large number of smaller projects. 
This chapter discusses the commercial framework of the SCIRT alliance. 
 
Methodology 
The form of alliance developed for the delivery of the infrastructure 
rebuild has some unique features and Data has been collected through the 
11 | P a g e  
 
studying of the alliance agreement and the most recent versions of the 
management plans. Certain clarifications on the interpretation of the 
commercial framework as well as the history of the formation of the 
alliance has been sought by interviewing members of the management 
and commercial teams within the alliance. 
 
The results from the data collection were compared with available 
literature on alliance contracts and the differences identified were 
discussed in this chapter. 
The SCIRT Alliance Model 
The SCIRT alliance model has been developed to ensure competitive 
tension by providing the client organisations with value for money. 
Alliance Structure 
An alliance structure has been created to assess, manage, co-ordinate, 
prioritise, design, estimate and deliver the various work packages 
associated with the rebuild of the Christchurch Infrastructure programme. 
The management team responsible for the above functions is referred to 
as the IST. The SCIRT alliance structure is shown in Figure 1 SCIRT 
Alliance Structure. 
The alliance was created between Central Government, Local 
Government and NZTA as the OPs and 5 of the major construction 
companies in the New Zealand civil construction industry as the NOPs. 
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The NOPs were the same companies that were involved in the IRMO 
programme. These construction companies formed a Joint Venture which 
then entered into the alliance with the OPs. A senior executive member of 
each organisation is represented on the alliance board. The function of the 
alliance board is to oversee the rebuild programme while the daily 
management has been delegated to the management team embedded in 
the IST and oversees the various services required to deliver the 
programme. In order to prevent price fixing and ensure fair trade 
practises are being followed as well as to ensure price tension between 
the delivery teams, the setting of the TOC for each project is done by a 
dedicated estimating team in the IST and independent of the delivery 
teams. 
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Figure 1 SCIRT Alliance Structure 
Commercial Model 
Reimbursement of the alliance services will be paid progressively across 
several categories within the alliance structure as follows: 
 
The actual cost to deliver each project is fully reimbursable with a 
pain/gain incentive also known as a 3-limb payment structure (see Table 
1). Each project will have a TOC, which is the estimated Limb 1 cost to 
deliver the project. The Limb 2 component for each project is a fixed 
amount calculated as an agreed percentage to compensate for corporate 
overheads and assumed profit on the original TOC value. The Limb 2 
component for each project will be adjusted when the TOC value is 
revised through approved WSC. Approved WSC impact on the variance 
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between the actual cost and TOC, which in turn impacts on the Limb 3 
component (see Table 1) Limb 3 is the aggregated TOC overruns and 
underruns across the programme of works with 50% share taken by the 
OPs. The remainder is distributed amongst the delivery teams based on 
the share of completed TOCs assigned to each individual delivery team 
expressed as a percentage of the Programme TOC. 
 
The NOPs provide a significant proportion of the resources and services 
required for the IST to function and are reimbursed actual costs as well as 
a Limb 2 margin (see Table 1) on these costs. The Limb 2 calculation 
does not apply to any goods and services provided by the OPs. 
 
Each delivery team’s off-site overhead TOC is set annually based on the 
expected turnover for each delivery team for the following financial year. 
This TOC includes for all staff required to run the business effectively 
i.e. safety quality and environmental management, commercial, 
communications teams etc. but excludes any project specific staff such as 
supervision and project managers. Reimbursement for the cost of the off-
site overheads is also paid under a 3-limb commercial framework. 
 
Competitive tension between the delivery teams has been built into the 
alliance model, with the performance of each delivery team’s actual costs 
measured against the TOC for each individual project adjusted to reflect 
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their performance against the non-cost SCIRT KRA’s. This ensures the 
OPs get value for money, but also provide the ability for benchmarking 
of each delivery team against other teams. Projects are allocated based on 
performance; those delivery teams that perform best are allocated a 
greater share of work than those that perform poorly. 
 
Earned value analysis is undertaken monthly to provide a measure of 
actual cost and schedule performance of each project but importantly 
serves as an early warning tool for cost overruns and delays 
 
Table 1 3-Limb payment explained 
Target TOC TOC established by the SCIRT estimating team 
and verified by the independent estimator 
Payment Limb 1 Net actual cost reimbursed 
Limb 2 Margin (“offsite overheads & profit”) 
Fixed at percentage of TOC [LS]+agreed 
percentage x IST costs in proportion to NOPs 
allocation of the ∑TOC (excludes client supplied 
goods & services) 
Limb 3 If Limb 1> TOC →pain/ limb 1 < TOC → (gain) 
 If pain = NOPs will pay 50% x pain less a bonus 
to a max of 10% based on KRA performance 
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 If Gain = NOPs retain 50% x gain plus bonus to a 
max of 10% on KRA performance 
 Final distribution in proportion to NOPs 




Figure 2 payment model explained showing the difference between Limb 1,2 &3 
 
Project Lifecycle 
The project lifecycle in SCIRT is a linear process with a nine point “gate” 
structure (the gated structure is shown in Figure 3), commencing with 
asset assessment to determine the extent of damage to the asset. Should 
the damage be earthquake related, a project is defined and both a design 
and delivery team are appointed to work towards achieving the most cost 
effective solution in terms of whole of life cost. Following the 
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completion of detailed design, an Independent and first principles TOC 
estimate is undertaken within the IST and verified independently through 
a parallel pricing exercise by a client appointed independent estimator. 
Final allocation for construction by a delivery team follows TOC 
completion through a process that is described later in this chapter.  
 
 
Figure 3 Gated project structure used in SCIRT 
 
Design Services 
Four design teams have been established in the IST offices, these teams 
are a combination of multiple local design consultancy companies in 
Christchurch that were selected through a tender process. In the SCIRT 
alliance model, design services for each project is procured from one of 
the four design teams in accordance with the procurement management 
plan which outlines a competitive process based on cost performance and 
abilities of each design team, whilst design cost is reimbursable on a time 
and cost basis. 
 
SCIRT encourages innovation in design and is allowed to seek departure 
from the client’s design standards and specifications through what is 
referred to as SSC. This is a committee made up of the various asset 
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owners from the OPs and representatives from central government and 
NZTA. In order to get approval for a departure during design, the 
particular lead designer submits a paper with a recommendation and a 
cost estimate, provided by the estimating team, to SSC for consideration. 
Once the design for an individual project is completed, the designers 
produces a full set of “for construction” design documentation including, 
drawings, specifications, risk register and a BOQ.  
 
Early Contractor Involvement  
Alliance contracting provides an opportunity for construction input 
during the detailed design phase (see Figure 4) through ECI (Queensland 
Government Chief Procurement Office, 2008). The purpose of ECI in the 
SCIRT alliance is for the design team and the dedicated ECI manager and 
project manager from the delivery team to work collaboratively to ensure 
constructability opportunities, issues and risks are identified and taken 
into consideration throughout the design phase of each project. Regular 
interface meetings are held during the design phases including 
constructability workshops and risk workshops. The particular delivery 
team’s ECI manager has the responsibility to lead the interface by 
chairing the meeting and ensuring that the milestone dates is met 
(SCIRT, 2012) 
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Once the detailed design is completed the delivery team receives a copy 
of the “for construction” documentation to review. On every project the 
delivery team is responsible for confirming the quantities as derived by 
the designers accurately reflect the physical works as described by the 
project documentation.  
 
A further objective of ECI in the SCIRT alliance is to inform the 
development of a TOC for each project. The ECI team is required to 
provide the estimating team with a comprehensive set of documentation 
detailing methodology, schedule, and traffic management staging plans, 
temporary works as well as an inspection and test plan; they also have the 
opportunity to review the risk register to ensure the estimator is well 
informed to develop the TOC. 
 
Immediately prior to estimating a TOC a handover meeting is scheduled 
between the ECI manager and the estimator to discuss and agree the 
methodology required to construct the project. The key protocol of the 
handover meeting is that the meeting is open for discussions around 
methodology, schedule and risk but any discussion regarding cost is 
forbidden.  This is to prevent price fixing and to ensure the independence 
of the TOC is maintained. The ECI teams do not have access to the 
priced BOQ until the TOC has been signed off and allocated to the 
delivery team for construction. This approach satisfies the requirements 
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as set out by the commerce commission to ensure fair trade practises are 
being followed and no price fixing occurs. 
 
 
Figure 4 Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) in the project life cycle 
 
Risk 
By selecting an alliance model as the procurement option for co-
ordinating and managing the city’s rebuild, the OPs have expressed their 
willingness in sharing the risks associated with the programme of works. 
Risk in the rebuild has been divided in two levels, i.e. programme risk 
and project risk. An example of a programme risk is the risk of another 
earthquake causing damage to the newly repaired infrastructure. At the 
start of the alliance in 2011, the risk of another big earthquake occurring 
was very high, but over time the geological stresses beneath Christchurch 
have reduced, consequently the risk of another earthquake causing 
significant damage also reduces. A change in the design is also a 
programme risk in that a design change will constitute and adjustment to 
the original TOC. 
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The next level of risk is referred to as project risk, these items typically 
cover risks specific to an individual project such as the risk of trench 
collapse due to poor ground conditions. Risk on every project is managed 
with a live risk register that is created in concept design with input from 
the delivery team, designers, and stakeholder liaison and traffic 
management staff.  The risk register is constantly updated throughout the 
life of the project. During the preparation of a TOC each risk item is 
individually assessed and evaluated by means of a first principles 
approach. Once a TOC has been completed, the resultant provision for 
risk and opportunity is incorporated into the TOC. The delivery teams are 
responsible for risk on any quantity discrepancies in the design 
documentation provided by the designers along with managing the risk 
during the delivery phase. 
 
Target Outturn Cost for each project 
After the detailed design is completed for an individual project, the 
construction TOC is developed. The TOC is derived using first principles 
to estimate the value of Limb 1 to construct the project as designed and 
documented. It includes all the direct cost, based on agreed blended 
labour and plant rates from each individual delivery team, and market 
quotes for materials. The TOC also include onsite indirect cost items 
(supervision and site establishment) as well as an allowance for risk. 
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One of the benefits of an alliance is the reduction in variations and 
processing costs of variations or WSCs (Department of Treasury and 
Finance, 2006). Under this alliance model the TOC can be adjusted for 
scope amendments that are client instructed or as a result of design 
changes. Variations in quantities for items on the bill of quantities used to 
derive the TOC value do not constitute a TOC adjustment. 
 
Monthly Reporting 
Each delivery team uses its own company business systems, such as 
financial software packages and cost reporting structures, to capture the 
information and to report on the performance of each project. A monthly 
project progress claim on a life to date basis is submitted by each delivery 
team for the Limb 1 cost of each project, accompanied by a report with 
the forecast cost to complete per project (Smith, 2013). 
 
One of the key requirements of the alliance agreement is to report 
monthly on earned value for each project. Earned value, as an 
internationally recognised project management tool, that provides an 
accurate measure of cost and time performance compared to the planned 
values (Kim, 2009) i.e. the TOC and baseline schedule as developed by 
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the delivery team. Earned value is done by calculating the CPI and SPI 
for each project.  
 
The IST collates all the information from each delivery team into an 
overall reporting structure to track and report on the performance of the 
overall programme as well as forming the basis of calculating the 




One of the key objectives of the alliance agreement is to reward good 
performance through future work allocation and applies to both design 
and delivery teams. 
 
Design team allocation 
Design allocation is based on the performance capabilities of each design 
team as well as the knowledge of the particular asset i.e. waste water 
design capability or structures design capability within each design team 
and availability of design resources within each design team. Further to 
this, the following are also considered for design allocation by the design 
manager: 
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Quality – the quality of concept design and detailed design reports, 
measured based on a modified version of the performance assessment by 
evaluation system as developed by the NZTA (Topham, December 
2012), and also the value of design WSCs. Cost – performance against 
TOC, the average number of design hours to design $1M of work and the 
value of innovation captured and assessed on the value register. 
Timeless – delivery of reports and designs against target dates, average 
time to deliver $1M of design. 
Delivery team allocation 
The default position at the start of the programme was to split the work 
allocation equally by TOC value between the delivery teams, with five 
teams the default position was to allocate 20% work by TOC value per 
delivery team. 
 
The allocation of work is a two-step process taking the following into 
account: 
Part A: Influence of delivery team performance against KRA’s and 
cost performance against TOC for each project. 
Part B: Influence of delivery team capacity and other programme 
context. 
Although the delivery team performance model is formal, it 
provides flexibility to allow an overall “best for programme” 
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decision to be made in the allocating a project for instance if 
one team is over committed and cannot deliver a project on 
the scheduled time, it might be allocated to another team 
who has resource available. 
 
Part A – 5 Non-cost KRA’s have been identified in the alliance 
agreement while a set of KPI’s have been developed for each of the 
KRA’s to measure the performance of each team against the non-cost 
KRA’s by calculating a DPS for each delivery team on a 6 month 
weighted rolling average as follows: 
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Table 2 Non-Cost KRA's 
Key Result Area 
(% weighting) 
Key performance indicator (weighting) 
Safety (25%)  Measure of safety engagement /awareness (12.5% 
 Safety initiatives/action (7.5%) 
 Protection of utility services (5%) 
Value (30%)  Productivity (12%) 
 Construction quality (9%) 
 Innovations (9%) 
Our Team (15%)  Alignment & involvement of team (7.5%) 
 Wellbeing initiatives (3.75%) 




 Community & stakeholder satisfaction with 
product (8%) 
 Community & stakeholder satisfaction with 
communication (8%) 




 Construction culture & incident/hazard reports 
(6%) 
 Waste minimisation (4%) 
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Part B- The cost performance of each delivery team is measured for 
allocated projects under construction and in handover as aggregated 
earned value per delivery team/ costs to date and a combined 
performance score is calculated. The overall performance score is 
calculated and each delivery team’s standard deviation is calculated to 
determine the change in target work share split. 
 
Discussion 
Due to the complexities and high risk associated with disaster recovery 
projects an alliance has been chosen as procurement model (Department 
of Treasury and Finance, 2006) and was setup between central and local 
government in partnership with five of New Zealand’s major construction 
companies to co-ordinate resources and managing the rebuild 
programme.  
The design services for each project are being procured from contracted 
design consultants that are required to reside full –time in the IST offices, 
reporting to the management team within the IST. In this particular form 
of alliancing, due to the complexity of the commercial model and the 
number of companies involved, it was decided from the outset that the 
design consultants would not become formal participants of the alliance 
and therefore do not share in the gain/pain as in the more conventional 
alliances (Department of Treasury and Finance, 2006).  
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The delivery teams are however required to provide ECI into the design 
of each individual project by providing constructability input to ensure 
the design is optimised to reduce risk, reduction in project cost and 
improved performance against the schedule through collaboration 
(Jergeas & Van der Put, 2001), (Osipova & Eriksson, 2011). An objective 
of the ECI process in SCIRT is to inform the independent TOC 
development, once the design is completed, to ensure the methodology 
used to develop the TOC estimate is safe and constructible while all 
construction risks have been identified (SCIRT, 2012). 
 
The success of this alliance therefore relies heavily on trust and 
commitment between all parties involved while lessons learned is a key 
factor in problem-solving and a collaborative approach to proper risk 
assessment and management on future projects (Davis & Love, 2011). 
The principal of a two stage ECI process is not too dissimilar to a 
conventional ECI procurement process where the contract is formally 
awarded for delivery at the completion of detailed design and price 
development (Queensland Government Chief Procurement Office, 2008). 
 
In alignment with the SCIRT alliance agreement, good performance will 
be rewarded through future work allocation (SCIRT, 2011); this was 
done with the introduction of the DPS. The DPS has been designed to 
ensure the best performing team in all areas of the programme i.e. safety, 
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value, quality, environmental, cost and stakeholder liaison is rewarded 
with future work allocation, but also to drive innovation by introducing 
price tension in a collaborative environment (Teece, 1992). This reduces 
the reputational risk of the alliance by ensuring that a non-performing 
delivery team is not exposing the alliance to poor work performance, but 
also ensures value for money to the client organisations.  
 
Partnering as a procurement model has been developed to avoid disputes 
and improves cooperation between all parties because the construction 
industry has long been criticised for its lack of cooperation (Davis & 
Love, 2011). The DPS is the centre of the commercial model in that 
future work allocation depends on the DPS performance of individual 
delivery teams, while future work allocation in turn influence the off-site 
Preliminary and General which is based on expected annual turnover. 
The best performing team would, as a result of more work being 
allocated, be able to successfully grow its business and employ more 
staff. The Limb 3 calculation is shared in relation to the amount of 
projects performed as a percentage of the programme of works, which is 
the same with other forms of alliance contracts (Department of Treasury 
and Finance, 2006). However the SCIRT alliance agreement rewards 
good delivery performance through work allocation, which in turn will 
result in a bigger gain/pain share for the best performing team. Therefore 
the DPS is creating price tension between the delivery teams while the 
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Limb 3 gain/pain share incentive ensures collaboration between the 
alliance participants throughout the project lifecycle (Love, Davis, Robert 
, & Edwards, 2011). 
The development of the TOC independently, from the delivery team, 
within the IST is based on blended plant and labour rates. These blended 
rates represent the average plant and labour rates that each of the delivery 
teams agreed with the Independent Estimator on an annual basis and 
claim as part of their Limb 1 cost per project. The blended rates for 
labour used in the TOC build up include all uplift cost such as over time, 
medical allowances, training, personal protective equipment etc. whereas 
plant rates include all cost including replacement value and maintenance 
cost. Material prices are market related as quotations from various 
suppliers and or specialist subcontractors are being obtained by the IST 
estimating team during the estimating process. The TOC estimate is a 
first principles build up, but the actual procurement of the works is a 
business decision for the delivery team whether to self-perform, the use 
subcontractors to help ease with resource availability, any specialist 
subcontractors as well as which suppliers to use. To ensure that the TOC 
is fair and market related, an independent estimator performs a full 
parallel estimate for every project based on the same design 
documentation, using the same blended rates, but not necessarily 
accepting the same methodology and once alignment is reached i.e. 
within 2% of the overall value, following a discussion and alignment of 
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assumptions on price variances for activities listed in the bill of 
quantities, the TOC is reviewed by senior IST management staff and 
released for construction allocation. The TOC is not a complete open 
book in that the delivery teams do not have insight into the price build up 
until the TOC has been allocated after sign off with the independent 
estimator, but also because it is based on blended rates. Each project is 
then delivered by one of the delivery teams as on a cost reimbursable 
basis, with a gain/pain share arrangement while the financial performance 
of the delivery team is measured against the TOC. 
 
Compensation for physical works completed is based on actual cost 
incurred by the delivery teams. Each company has its own collective 
agreement with labour unions, these agreements vary between the 
employers and as a result there is no consistency between the delivery 
teams in terms of base wage rates, medical benefits, amount of over time 
etc. The total cost of employment i.e. including over time etc. is a 
reimbursable Limb 1 cost for each of the delivery teams. The possible 
implication of this is that some of the construction companies might have 
different staff benefits or higher base salary rates which mean that their 
labour cost might be higher than the TOC allowance for labour and as a 
result could impact on their performance against TOC.  
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The same also applies to the procurement of specialist subcontractors and 
suppliers, which are business decisions for each of the delivery teams, 
could be different to what is allowed for in the TOC and could potentially 




SCIRT as a multi-client, multi-contractor alliance has been setup to 
manage the rebuild of Christchurch’s damaged civil infrastructure with 
some significantly different features to the more familiar “classes” of 
alliance contracts. In this form of alliance, the design teams are on cost 
reimbursable agreements as opposed to a conventional alliance where the 
design consultancy is a NOP of the alliance and share in the gain/pain of 
the overall project performance.  
 
Another unique characteristic of this alliance is to reward good delivery 
team performance on projects through future work allocation which is 
achieved by means of the project delivery allocation process. This is done 
by means of a DPS which is used to evaluate the performance of each of 
the delivery teams against the construction TOC of each project and the 
SCIRT non-cost KRA’s as agreed by the alliance board. The tension of 
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the DPS and the collaboration of the gain/pain share drive innovation and 
ensuring value for money for the client organisations.  
Within the SCIRT alliance model the development of the construction 
TOC for each project is an independent process with no price input from 
the delivery teams. 
 
ECI is included in the alliance model, which means the TOC 
development is well informed and constructability advice is available 
during the design and TOC development.  
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Chapter 3 Relationship between ECI and Financial 
Performance in the Rebuilding of Infrastructure in 
Christchurch 
 
Botha Paul, S. Scheepbouwer Eric Relationship Between Early 
Contractor Involvement and Financial Performance in the Rebuilding of 
Infrastructure in Christchurch, New Zealand. 
Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation 
Research Board. No 2504, Transportation Research Board, Washington, 
D.C., 2015 pp.66-72 
 
Introduction 
ECI is provided by the delivery teams as a structured process to provide 
design teams with constructability advice, ensuring issues and 
construction risks are identified to enable them to be taken into 
consideration throughout the design process (Ekaterina & Eriksson, 
2011). The objective of ECI in SCIRT is to ensure the independent TOC 
pricing is well informed in terms of a safe methodology and construction 
associated risks identified are properly assessed. In present research the 
financial data from 288 projects that are in construction, handover and 
practical completion are assessed to illustrate the cost certainty of TOC 
projects that have had ECI. 
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This chapter provides a better understanding of the financial performance 
of the rebuild programme.  
 
Literature Review 
One of the benefits of alliance contracting is having access to 
construction personnel during the design phase of the project to help 
make more informed decisions to optimise the design and managing risks 
through a collaborative approach by all parties involved (Department of 
Treasury and Finance, 2006).  
 
To date major infrastructure projects have a history for incurring cost 
overruns, which are often due to ineffective risk management and the 
lack of accountability (Flyvberg, Bruzeluis, & Rothengatter, 2003). 
Commitment to partnering from all parties involved, early involvement 
of contractors during the design, the identification of risk, trust and 
relationships have been identified as key factors for mitigating risk and 
also the success of TOC projects (Chan D. W., Chan, Lam, & Wong, 
2010), (Davis & Love, 2011), (Chan, Chan, & Lam, 2012). 
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Methodology 
A quantitative analysis on which this chapter is based was done using the 
actual monthly financial data of 288 projects that are either in 
construction, handover or practical completion gates, as at the end of 
February 2014, in the SCIRT rebuild programme. The results of the 
analysis have been verified through discussions with the programme’s 
Risk Manager, other members of the commercial and management team 
and delivery team members in addition to comparing with available 
literature on ECI and alliance contracting. Other possible contributing 
factors such as procurement of subcontractors, experience of staff, risk 
events that may have occurred on site etc. have not been taken into 
consideration during this analysis. 
 
Early Contractor Involvement in the SCIRT rebuild 
In the SCIRT rebuild programme each delivery team has to engage a 
dedicated ECI manager that works collaboratively with the design teams 
to provide constructability input into the design to ensure all construction 
risks have been taken into consideration during the design (Ekaterina & 
Eriksson, 2011). This is achieved through regular meetings as well as risk 
and constructability workshops. The interface meetings are led by the 
ECI manager from the delivery team who is also responsible for ensuring 
all key milestones are met (SCIRT, 2012). 
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At the end of the detailed design phase the ECI manager’s responsibility 
extends to ensure that the required deliverables are submitted for 
consideration by the estimator when pricing the work activities to 
construct the project. The key deliverables required are methodology, 
traffic staging details, construction schedule in bar chart format, an 
updated risk register and an ITP. It is also the responsibility of the ECI 
manager to review the bill of quantities prepared by the designers to 
confirm that it accurately reflects the scope of works and also tie in with 
the proposed methodology to construct the work safely. (See Table 3 Key 
roles and responsibilities during ECI). 
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Table 3 Key roles and responsibilities during ECI 
ECI Team member Responsibilities 
ECI manager from delivery 
team 
 Lead and chair ECI team interactions 
 Ensuring key dates are met 
 Review of BOQ 
Design lead  Identify and communicate design 
parameters and issues 
 Evaluate input from delivery team and 
integrate modifications as required to the 
design and risk register 
Delivery lead/ project 
Manager 
 Communicate construction methodology 
and any associated issues 
 Required to evaluate input from designer 
and make modifications as required to the 
methodology and risk register 
 
At the commencement of pricing the works and, following the 
submission of the ECI deliverables and design documentation to the 
estimator, the estimator, ECI manager and the independent estimator 
arrange a handover meeting during which the project is discussed and any 
concerns or differences on methodology are resolved and agreed. During 
this meeting discussions around methodology, duration and risks are 
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encouraged but any discussion around price is prohibited to ensure the 
independence of the TOC and to prevent any direct influence from the 
delivery teams. 
 
The ECI process also provides the delivery team with the opportunity for 
early construction planning in that it gives an opportunity to understand 
the project and plan for construction. One of the key deliverables also 
required for pre-construction planning is the traffic staging information, 
which is also to be submitted for approval by the local authorities prior to 
construction commencement to inform the council of potential road 
closures and detours etc. 
  
In the SCIRT alliance model, construction allocation follows TOC sign 
off and is based on the DPS. Providing ECI input during the design of 
each project is no guarantee that the project will be allocated to the 
delivery team who provided ECI input during the design and TOC gates 
for each project. 
 
Target Outturn Cost 
On completion of the detailed design of a project, the TOC for each 
project is estimated by a member of the team of resident estimators 
within the IST seconded to SCIRT from the 5 construction companies. 
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Each TOC is set independent of any financial input from the delivery 
teams. The TOC is determined from a first principle build-up using plant 
and labour rates as agreed with the independent verifier, employed 
directly by the OPs, and material supply pricing from the market. Each 
TOC is signed off by the independent verifier once alignment is reached 
following a parallel estimating process (Office of the Auditor General, 
November 2013). 
 
Once a TOC has been signed off and the project allocated to a delivery 
team for construction, a TOC can only be adjusted through an approval 
process referred to as WSCs. A WSC is only approved for design 
changes, client instructions and project definition changes. Once the 
WSC is approved and evaluated, the original TOC value is adjusted and 
issued. 
 
Defined periods within the programme of works 
With the quick transition from disaster to rebuilding the infrastructure, 
three distinct periods within the programme of works have been 
identified to date i.e. transition, ramp-up and steady state. A fourth period 
will occur gradually across the programme which is the ramp-down. 
During this period staff and contractors will transition out of the rebuild 
programme back to a “business as usual” environment. Each of these 
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periods has some unique characteristics that have significantly impacted 
on the financial performance across of the programme of works. 
 
Transition Period 
After the signing of the alliance agreement in September 2011, all the 
projects identified under IRMO that were in design and construction 
stage were transferred to SCIRT. Projects with designs that were either 
completed or well advanced were estimated and constructed under the 
SCIRT alliance commercial model (Office of the Auditor General, 
November 2013). During the IRMO period, a close relationship was 
established between contractor and design consultancy, the designs were 
well informed albeit it mainly for small emergency repair projects; the 
identified construction risks were well developed and incorporated into 
the design and construction methodologies identified albeit very 
informally. These projects were procured on a basis similar to a typical 
design and construct project, where each contractor had independently 
engaged and managed a design consultancy to provide the professional 
design services.  
 
The projects that were transferred to SCIRT with designs that were well 
advanced were prioritised for construction during the Transition period 
between October 2011 and February 2012. These projects were mostly 
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water mains although the first of the gravity waste water projects were 
estimated and delivered during this period. (See table 2 for average 
transition period project size) 
Ramp-up period 
SCIRT has an obligation to complete the programme of works within a 
set period of time (Office of the Auditor General, November 2013). In 
order to achieve this, a certain volume of work was scheduled to be 
completed per month across the programme. This in turn requires every 
gate in the process to meet a minimum monthly target. Once the designs 
of the smaller projects were completed, the prioritisation of catchments 
was well advanced and the design of larger projects was able to be 
undertaken. During the ramp-up period, from about March 2012 through 
to October 2012, a greater number of complex projects were designed 
than during the transition period. These were typically large diameter 
pressure mains, waste water pump stations and civil structures such as 
bridges. In order to meet the programme completion date of December 
2016, a minimum monthly construction spend was required. Resource 
availability and competency of construction personal are constraints for 
resourcing a natural disaster recovery programme (Chang & Wilkonson, 
2012). Due to the increase in project size, a lack of resource from 
delivery teams while the systems and procedures in the IST were still 
being developed, ECI input during the design was limited. During this 
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period there was very little formal risk and constructability workshops 
etc. as everyone was focussed on constructing the work packages in the 
field. As a result the design and TOC development of the projects during 
the ramp-up period were not well informed. 
 
During this period the programme as a whole across all delivery teams 
suffered a significant blow out against TOC for each project. Because of 
the pressure to demonstrate progress and give the people of Christchurch 
confidence in the rebuild, projects during this period were designed and 
priced with a less than optimal constructability input. This meant that 
some designs were at risk of being incomplete and the independent TOC 
development was uninformed as to the correct methodology and 
associated risks all because of minimum ECI. The ramp-up period also 
saw a significant increase in project size which occurred during a time 
when the SCIRT business systems and reporting structures was still being 
developed (See table 2 for average ramp-up period project size). Due to 
the pressure of constructing the increased volume of work during the 
ramp-up, the delivery teams had to increase their workforce which led to 
inexperienced staff (Chang & Wilkonson, 2012) being brought into the 
concept of alliance contracting. Other factors such as procurement of 
subcontractors and suppliers have also contributed to the financial 
performance of some of the projects during this period. 
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Steady state 
As the staff became more familiar with the SCIRT processes and 
business systems were developed, ECI input became a formalised and 
documented process. During the current steady state period, from 
November 2012 to date, there has been an increased focus from SCIRT 
on improving the constructability input into the design and informing the 
independent TOC development through as per the ECI guidelines 
(SCIRT, 2012).  
 
Projects designed during this period, had risk workshops and 
constructability workshops that are being attended by the nominated ECI 
team to provide constructability input into the design and ensuring that all 
construction risks have been identified and mitigated in the design where 
possible. During the current steady state period, a formal handover 
meeting and site visit is scheduled by the delivery team with the 
estimator to ensure that the methodology and risks are understood and 
taken into consideration for TOC development. Discussions are permitted 
around methodology, risk and duration but discussions on cost remain 
prohibited. (See Table 4 Average project size (in millions) per period in 
the SCIRT programme) 
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Table 4 Average project size (in millions) per period in the SCIRT programme 







Transition 55 591 1,507 
Ramp-up 94 2,027 2,931 
Steady-State 139 3,792 4,188 
Total 288 2,604 3,635 
 
Data Analysis 
The month end financial data as at the end of February 2014 was 
analysed taken into consideration all 288 SCIRT projects from all 5 
delivery teams that are in construction, handover and practical 
completion. The available data consist of project number, project name, 
programme period, delivery team name, design team name, gate the 
project is currently in, TOC completion date, date deliverables were 
submitted, original TOC value, revised TOC value (adjusted after 
approved WSCs), cost live to date and forecast final cost, pain/ (gain) 
(see figure 4 for pain/(gain) calculation). All statistical analyses were 
performed using SPSS version 20. 
 
A normality test of the % pain/ (gain) as the dependant variable per 
period of projects with deliverables submitted has been performed and 
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was found to be approximately normally distributed using the Normal Q-
Q plot. A univariate analysis of variance was calculated and the estimated 
marginal means of the % pain/ (gain) per period in the programme were 
analysed in order to assess the financial impact of ECI input in to the 
estimate of the TOC for each project. (See Equation 1). 
 
Equation 1 Pain/(Gain) Calculation 
 
Results 
Financial Performance of the SCIRT programme 
From the calculation of the average pain per period of the SCIRT 
programme, it is evident that the programme performed differently 
throughout the duration of the rebuild. During the transition stage in the 
early stage of the programme the programme performed really well with 
a (1.62%) gain. During the current steady state, the programme is 
showing a significant improvement in the financial performance against 
TOC albeit slightly in pain of 0.86%. (See Table 5 Estimated average 
gain/pain per period of the programme) 
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Transition 55 (1.6%) 4.8% -11.1% 7.6% 
Ramp-up 94 12.0% 3.7% 4.7% 19.2% 
Steady-state 139 0.9% 3.0% -5.1% 6.8% 
 
The difference in pain/(gain) between the transition stage and the ramp-
up is 10.4% while the difference between the ramp-up and steady state is 
11.1% (See table 3), with an average of 10.75% financial improvement of 
projects with ECI input during design and price development. The large 
variance in the upper and lower bound of the mean pain/gain is indicative 
of the big variance in the performance of some individual projects. There 
are various other factors that are not related to ECI such as procurement 
of subcontractors and suppliers, project management and also the costs 
associated with realised risks that significantly impact on the financial 
performance of projects.  
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Financial impact of projects with ECI deliverables 
submitted 
ECI during the transition period was interactive and informal, which was 
as a result of the designs being developed during the IRMO arrangement. 
The design of these projects were completed during the IRMO period 
where the designers were reporting directly to the construction company. 
When these projects were transferred to the SCIRT programme for 
estimating and construction, there was no requirement from the IST to 
submit the ECI deliverables for the estimate to be completed. 
Communication with the estimator was also encouraged during the 
transition period and although some projects did not received formal 
deliverables, the communication with the estimator was informative. 
 
During the ramp-up some projects have started before the design and 
TOC was completed. As a result very little effort from the delivey teams 
was put in to properly inform the design and TOC estimate as they were 
under pressure to start constructing the projects in order to maintain 
confidence in the rebuilding of the citys’ damaged infrastructure. There 
was also no requirement during the ramp-up to get the deliverables 
submitted prior to the TOC being signed off, nor was there any 
communication with the estimator. Towards the end of the ramp-up 
period the ECI guidelines were released combined with the instruction 
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from the IST that no construction activity is to start priot to the 
finalisation of a TOC.  
 
During the steady state period the TOCs are not allowed to be released 
prior to the deliverables being submitted and any differences with regards 
to the methodology have been resolved. However, at the start of the 
steady state there were some projects that were already being estimated 
that did not receive deliverables on time.  
For the analysis in Table 6 the estimated marginal mean of projects with 
ECI deliverables submitted were analysed as per the 3 periods in the 
programme to date. For this analysis the date the deliverables was 
uploaded onto the SCIRT document control system was compared 
relative to the date the TOC was signed off and released through the TOC 
gate for construction allocation. From an estimating perspective 
deliverables submitted late is the same as no deliverables submitted, but 
from a project perspective deliverables submitted late still indicates that 
pre-planning of construction has been undertaken for the project. 
  
50 | P a g e  
 
 
Table 6 Estimated marginal means of the pain/ (gain) of projects with ECI deliverables 




























16.4% (57.7%) 8.1% 








(0.1%) 17.5% (34.9%) 34.7% 








(0.3%) 2.9% (5.9%) 5.4% 
 
The 4 projects in the transition period with deliverables that were 
submitted late have an average gain of (24.8%) but because of the small 
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sample size the standard error of the mean of 16.4% is large. Considering 
the upper of 8.1% and lower bound of (57.7%) for these projects it could 
be argued that pre-construction planning made a significant difference in 
the performance of these projects. 
 
During the ramp-up, projects that have had no deliverables submitted has 
the biggest average pain in the programme of 14.3%, while projects 
during the same period that have had deliverables submitted on time has 
an average gain of (0.1%) which means that there is an improvement of 
14.4% against TOC of projects that have had deliverables submitted on 
time during the ramp-up period. During the same period there is a 3.9% 
improvement of performance against TOC for projects in the ramp-up 
that have had deliverables submitted late and therefore have had the 
benefit of pre-construction planning. 
 
Projects in the steady state that have had deliverables submitted on time 
are performing similar to the projects in the transition period with no 
formal deliverables submitted. The projects in the steady state that have 
had deliverables submitted late or not at all are in pain and performing 
slightly worse than the projects in the steady state with deliverables 
submitted but better than the projects in the ramp-up.  
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The combined estimated marginal mean pain/ (gain) of projects that have 
not had deliverables submitted or submitted late for TOC sign off during 
the steady state period is 3.0% while the projects in the same period that 
have had deliverables submitted have an estimated marginal mean gain of 
(0.30%) which indicates that there is a 3.3% improvement in 




The SCIRT alliance model was developed for all parties to work 
collaboratively to optimise the design solution through reducing risk by 
having access to ECI into the design of a project. ECI not only provides 
constructability input into the design, but also significantly informs the 
TOC estimate of each project and therefore gives the client organisation 
price certainty of the cost of the work. It is evident from analysing the 
financial data that with the programme broken into three distinct periods 
with varying ECI input into the design and TOC development that 
projects that have had ECI input during design and TOC setting are 
performing better financially and provides the client organisations with 
price certainty. ECI during detailed design and price development also 
provides early value transfer to the client organisations, through 
significant improvement of financial performance of projects. 
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By preparing the ECI deliverables that are required for developing the 
TOC, the delivery team by definition, is undertaking a substantial 
component of the pre-construction planning of a project This is evident 
from the result of projects that have had deliverables submitted late for 
the TOC development still perform better than projects that have had no 
deliverables submitted at all. 
 
ECI, whether informal and interactive or formal and documented, 
provides price certainty to client organisations by providing construction 
input during the design by identifying the construction risks. Good 
procurement practises and project management techniques is still 
required for the successful outcome of construction projects as ECI input 
into the design and price development is not a guarantee for the financial 
performance of a project 
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Chapter 4 Earthquake recovery versus routine maintenance of 
the waste water network in Christchurch. 
 
Botha Paul S, Scheepbouwer Eric, Earthquake recovery versus routine 
maintenance of the waste water network in Christchurch. 
Journal of structural integrity and maintenance, 2016 Vol 1 No. 2 88-93 
Introduction 
Immediately following the 22nd of February 2011 earthquake, a desk top 
assessment of the damage and a cost estimate of the repairs needed was 
completed and submitted to central government, with the expectation that 
as more information becomes available on the extent of the damage the 
estimate will be revised. Immediately following the February earthquake 
it became apparent that the design guidelines used prior to the 
earthquakes was inadequate and did not cover earthquake repairs 
sufficiently as it lacked resilience in the design. As a result the IRTSG 
was developed by the city council, this design guideline stipulated the 
intervention criteria for repairing the damaged waste water network 
which meant if the number of breaks in a pipe exceeded a certain number 
then the total length of pipe was replaced and it also allowed the use of 
more modern materials in the rebuild. 
 
55 | P a g e  
 
One of the first priorities of SCIRT was to undertake asset investigations 
of the asset types including the waste water network. The waste water 
network in Christchurch consists of more than 1600km of gravity 
pipelines. With over half of New Zealand’s CCTV resource assisting 
with the CCTV programme undertaken by SCIRT, the estimated time to 
complete the investigation was expected to be 4 years from October 2011 
when the alliance agreement was signed (Cubrinovski, et al., 
Performance of Horizontal Infrastructure in Christchurch City through 
the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, 2014). With December 
2016 as the planned completion date of SCIRT (Office of the Auditor 
General, November 2013) and the asset investigation forming a critical 
component of the programme for informing the design teams, SCIRT 
developed a range of assessment tools, including visual inspections and a 
pipe damage assessment tool (Heiler, Moore, & Gibson, 2012). These 
tools were all used to assist in assessing the damage to the waste water 
network across the city. As the asset assessment programme progressed 
and more information on the damage of the network became available, 
the design requirements were reviewed and adjustments made to the 
design guidelines. 
 
SCIRT also developed a prioritisation tool for prioritising the repair work 
by recognising the worst affected areas as the highest priority. Generally, 
the work commenced with the deeper waste water repairs, followed by 
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the roading, water supply and storm water. Geographically the work 
started in the eastern suburbs where most of the liquefaction and 
subsequent pipe damage occurred and progressed towards the least 
affected western suburbs. 
 
During the second half of 2012, the estimate for the rebuild of 
Christchurch’s horizontal infrastructure was updated based on more 
accurate information on the damage in the network as well as the cost 
associated with the repairs. As the investigation works progressed and 
moved further west, it became apparent that not all the damage required 
immediate repair actions and as a result significant changes to the design 
guidelines were developed and approved by SSC. These amendments to 
the design guideline recognise the remaining asset life of the pipes with 
the aim of restoring the network to the same level of service as prior to 
the earthquakes and also offered a significant saving to the client 
organisations with less repair work included in the rebuild programme of 
works 
 
In 2013 central and local government signed a cost share agreement for 
the repair of Christchurch’s infrastructure and as a result of this 
agreement an optimisation process was initiated in 2014. During this 
optimisation process the design guidelines for the repair of the waste 
water network was further refined to repair only critical assets where 
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there is value in doing so and if the asset was impacting on the 
performance of other assets (Trout, 2015). As part of this optimisation 
process, the IPSG was formed. This group was made up of 
representatives of the client organisations’ asset managers as well as 
financial advisers from central government and replaced the SSC for all 
further approvals of technical decisions and amendments to specifications 
and design guidelines. During the optimisation process a new design 
guideline (DG43B) as a further refinement to the IRTSG for waste water 
design was developed by central government which became the basis for 
their financial contribution for the remainder of the programme of works. 
The local council also developed a refinement to this design guideline 
(DG43A-1) that accepted blockages in lower grade pipes as less critical 
for repairs than the integrity of the pipe. The remainder of the waste 
water projects designed by SCIRT were designed in accordance with 
both design guidelines followed by a cost review once the designs were 
completed. The proposed designs were submitted to the IPSG with a 
recommendation and if the client organisations agreed to the merit of 
additional scope added to DG43B the scope was adjusted for 
construction, or else DG 43A-1 formed the design used for the rebuild of 
the particular project (Trout, 2015).  
 
The present research will be evaluating the waste water design guidelines 
and amendments used during the rebuild of Christchurch’s horizontal 
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infrastructure rebuild programme. Here the progressive development of 
the guidelines to recognise the remaining asset life of the waste water 
pipe network, together with the differences between the design guidelines 
will be discussed.  
 
Literature Review 
According to Alexander Hay, a natural disaster can be shown as the 
performance levels of infrastructure against time. The performance levels 
of infrastructure can drop as low as zero during an event with the 
immediate emergency response bringing the performance level of 
infrastructure back to a minimum performance capacity. This is followed 
by a more organised response period to bring the performance levels up 
to a minimum level of sustainability. It is during the recovery phase that 
the performance levels are restored to the same routine level as prior to 
the event. (Alexander, 2014) Figure 5 Timeline showing resilience 
showing performance of infrastructure 
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Figure 5 Timeline showing resilience showing performance of infrastructure (Alexander, 
2014) 
 
Christchurch has a very flat terrain, with an average slope of 0.1% - 0.2% 
from the western suburbs towards the east near the coast line. The city’s 
existing waste water network consist of mainly gravity pipes installed in 
the middle of the road with minimum cover of 1.2m. Due to the flat 
topography of the land, the grades in the gravity system is significantly 
less than normal waste water networks with velocities of less than 0.7m/s. 
As a result of the flat grades traditional maintenance included regular 
flushing of the network with water from shallow wells. Since 1986, when 
the drainage board manual was last revised, more robust self-cleaning 
velocities were introduced. The currently used waste water design 
guidelines do not eliminate the need for flushing but only encourage 
more reliance on self-cleaning (Christchurch City Council, 2015).  
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The pipe materials used in the development of the network include 
Earthenware, Concrete, PVC and Asbestos and the materials used was 
reflective of the preferred choice of materials at the time when parts of 
the network was developed (Cubrinovski, et al., Liquefaction impacts on 
pipe networks, 2011). During the CES, different pipe materials 
performed differently with PVC and PE pipe materials performing better 
in lateral movement, differential settlement and areas of liquefaction than 
AC and EW (O'Rourke, et al., 2014), (Cubrinovski, Henderson, & 
Bradley, Liquefaction Impacts in residential areas in the 2010 - 2011 
Christchurch Earthquakes, 2014)  
 
The two main earthquake events i.e. the September and February quakes 
caused significant damage to the waste water network due to its depth. 
Following the February 22nd earthquake, 40% of the network had limited 
to no service following the event with damage to the waste water 
network, mainly consisted of loss in gravity pipe grades, damage to pipe 
joints and also high levels of liquefaction infiltration into the network. 
(Cubrinovski, et al., Liquefaction impacts on pipe networks, 2011). The 
majority of damage to pipes occurred in areas with high levels of 
liquefaction, with 80% of broken pipes found in areas of high levels of 
liquefaction (Cubrinovski, Henderson, & Bradley, Liquefaction Impacts 
in residential areas in the 2010 - 2011 Christchurch Earthquakes, 2014). 
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The implications of the broken network ranged from increased overflows 
into the local rivers which led to consent breaches, significant damage at 
the city’s waste water treatment plant with sand and silt entering the 
treatment plant and also the use of chemical toilets in especially the 




The research for this chapter is based on a quantitative analyses of the 
different design guidelines approved and implemented during the 
infrastructure rebuild programme in Christchurch. 
 
Different design guidelines used during the Christchurch 
rebuild 
During the SCIRT rebuild programme a of number wastewater design 
guidelines were developed, approved and implemented during various 
stages within the programme as outlined in Figure 6 wastewater 
guidelines used during the Christchurch rebuild. 
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Figure 6 wastewater guidelines used during the Christchurch rebuild 
Infrastructure recovery technical standards and 
guidelines (IRTSG) 
The earthquake of the 22nd of February 2011 in Christchurch caused a 
significant increase in the damage to the city’s already damaged 
infrastructure. A review of the design guidelines used prior to the CES 
indicated that it did not sufficiently address the repair work to earthquake 
damage. As a result the IRTSG was developed by the Christchurch City 
Council and introduced to the rebuild programme in October 2011. The 
IRTSG was specific in the type of damage that needed repairs i.e. failure 
in grade or if a pipe length had a certain number of breaks the line was 
replaced.  
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Three revisions of the IRTSG were issued, these revisions included 
refinements to the acceptance criteria of earthquake damage as well as 
separating construction and service defects identifying during the 
inspection of the pipe (Heiler, Moore, & Gibson, 2012).  
 
Level of Service Approach 
As the waste water network inspections in Christchurch progressed it was 
realised that not all the damage had to be replaced immediately as the 
assets still had sufficient asset life remaining. This was recognised by the 
asset assessment team within the IST who in collaboration with the 
Christchurch City Council developed a set of design guidelines that was 
approved by SSC, to provide the designers guidance for assessing 
earthquake defects in gravity wastewater pipes when utilising asset life 
where appropriate. This design guideline deferred all defects in the pipe 
network if the remaining asset life is more than 15 years (Heiler, Moore, 
& Gibson, 2012).  
 
The design guideline used by the designers for this was SCIRT design 
guideline 43 as per Figure 6. This document was issued in March 2013, 
after approval by SSC and revised in October 2013. Approximately 30% 
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of the network was design and constructed in accordance with this design 
guideline (Trout, 2015). 
 
Repair of critical assets 
Early 2014 design guideline 43A was developed. This guideline, even 
though not implemented, worked on the basis of addressing only critical 
repairs that will lead to failure of the particular asset within the next 15 
years. This guideline was again developed by SCIRT, and the principals 
was only applied by SCIRT when approved by SSC.  
 
Repair of assets if there is value in doing the repair works 
In June 2013, the cost share agreement between the Christchurch City 
Council and central government was signed which capped the central 
government contribution towards the rebuild. This was followed by an 
optimisation process, initiated by the OPs, and a new set of design 
guidelines was developed. Design guideline 43 B is very specific in 
which defects was to be deferred to the maintenance programme by 
excluding defects pipes with a remaining asset life of more than 5 years 
from the rebuild programme of works. The local government asset 
owners developed another design guideline DG 43A-1 as a result of the 
possible impact on the maintenance budgets of deferred work from DG 
43 B. It was agreed between local and central government that the waste 
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water networks will be design in accordance with both design guidelines 
and at the end of detailed design, only one of the designs will be 
constructed. The preferred design was selected through a discussion 
between representatives from both central and local governments based 
on the cost of doing additional repairs. 
 
These two design guidelines set some parameters around requirements 
for replacing an asset if it has a remaining life of less than 5 years, the 
asset was identified as being a critical asset, had a high maintenance cost 
and was impacting on other assets i.e. may cause localised road failure. 
 
Discussion 
The immediate response to the damaged waste water pipes was in the 
worst affected areas where no service was available. The loss of service 
was due to the high levels of liquefaction and the pipe materials used for 
the construction of the existing network. In response to the lack of 
resilience and to include modern materials in the rebuild, the 
Christchurch City Council developed and introduced the IRTSG at the 
start of SCIRT. This guideline provided immediate response to the worst 
affected areas by specifying the requirements for the replacement of the 
damaged infrastructure.  
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The scale of the disaster and the large waste water network placed a 
significant demand on New Zealand’s CCTV resources. This combined 
with a lack of understanding of the performance of the network across the 
city meant that a conservative approach in the initial estimate of the 
rebuild was taken based on the IRTSG. Initially during the rebuild 
programme, the emphasis was on restoring the service that was lost 
which resulted in the replacement of some of the pipes without 
recognition of the remaining asset life.  
 
As the investigation works moved west across the city into areas that 
experienced much lower levels of liquefaction from the earthquakes and 
where modern pipe materials such as PVC have been used to construct 
the original network, the waste water pipes performed better with less 
damage while service was still available. The reduction in the damage to 
the network combined with the council’s regular maintenance 
programme, which included the flushing of the waste water network, 
resulted in the amendments to the design guidelines by taking into 
consideration the remaining asset life of the pipes. 
 
Conclusions 
Each amendment to the IRTSG increased the acceptable remaining asset 
life of the pipe to be used in the design of the repairs. This resulted in less 
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damage in the network being accepted as earthquake related damage in 
need of immediate repairs. The implemented amendments to the 
guidelines therefore became revised damage thresholds of acceptable 
earthquake damage. 
 
Different damage thresholds applied to different areas in the city because 
of the varying ground conditions and also different pipe materials 
performing differently with certain materials performing better than 
others. 
 
By taking into account the remaining asset life, a considerable saving to 
the client organisations could be offered by recognising the remaining 
asset life of the pipes.  
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Chapter 5 Application of the design guidelines across 
Christchurch city during the rebuild of the earthquake 
damaged infrastructure programme 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents information on how the design guidelines, as 
described in chapter 4, were implemented during the rebuild across the 
different damaged areas in Christchurch. This chapter also provide 
support to the financial analyses of chapter 6 in terms of the database and 
its application in this research. 
 
Background 
Christchurch was originally mainly a swamp behind sand dunes, with 
estuaries and lagoons. These soils overlay the Riccarton gravels, which is 
also the upper aquifer with artesian pressures. The water tables in the 
western parts of the city is approximately 5m below the surfaces and gets 
shallower towards the east where it nearly touches the surface. 
(Cubrinovski, Henderson, & Bradley, Liquefaction Impacts in residential 
areas in the 2010 - 2011 Christchurch Earthquakes, 2014). 
 
The first earthquake on the 4th of September 2010 recorded a maximum 
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) of 0.24 g in the CBD. The February 
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22nd 2011 earthquake recorder several PGAs of between 0.37g and 0.52g 
in the CBD. (Cubrinovski, Henderson, & Bradley, Liquefaction Impacts 
in residential areas in the 2010 - 2011 Christchurch Earthquakes, 2014) 
 
The eastern suburbs were the worst hit by liquefaction due to the loose 
fluvial deposits of liquefiable sand. The high water table combined with 
the strong ground movement during the earthquakes resulted in high 
levels of liquefaction (Cubrinovski, Henderson, & Bradley, Liquefaction 
Impacts in residential areas in the 2010 - 2011 Christchurch Earthquakes, 
2014). Buried pipes suffered significant damage in each of the 2 major 
events (Cubrinovski, Henderson, & Bradley, Liquefaction Impacts in 
residential areas in the 2010 - 2011 Christchurch Earthquakes, 2014). The 
damage to the waste water network was caused by loss of grade, broken 
pipe joints and also liquefaction infiltration (Cubrinovski, et al., 
Liquefaction impacts on pipe networks, 2011). Significant parts of the 
city had no service available for up to 3 months following the February 
2011 earthquake (Cubrinovski, Henderson, & Bradley, Liquefaction 
Impacts in residential areas in the 2010 - 2011 Christchurch Earthquakes, 
2014). 
 
Immediately following the earthquakes, the primary focus was to restore 
the services to the worst affected areas. Once the service was restored, an 
order of priority for the rebuild programme was developed to repair the 
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infrastructure from the worst affected areas to the least affected areas. 
(Botha & Scheepbouwer, 2016) 
 
Methodology 
A quantitative analysis was done using the waste water as-built CCTV 
database from the SCIRT rebuild programme, which include projects that 
have been completed and handed over to the Council up to the end of 
April 2016. The database from SCIRT includes a lot of information for 
each pipe. The information on the database is captured in the SCIRT GIS 
system and transferred to the Christchurch City Council asset register 
software once all the hand-over documentation is completed. At the time 
of research the rebuild programme is still being undertaken with projects 
still in construction and as a result the last 8 months of outstanding as-
built CCTV data is still to be recorded and verified. Therefore the 
database is not a complete list of assets assessed and repaired during the 
rebuild programme of works.  
 
The data includes the original asset register from the Christchurch City 
Council prior to the start of the earthquakes in 2010. Information from 
completed SCIRT projects are collected during the as-built process which 
includes a CCTV inspection of all installed waste water pipes that have 
been worked on during the rebuild. During the as-built CCTV inspection 
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the information such as repair method etc. are being recorded for each 
pipe.  
 
At the start of the rebuild, the handover process was not well defined and 
the information required for SCIRT’s own internal records as well as to 
hand the information back to the Council was not defined until later in 
the programme. This was due to the initial focus being on getting the 
construction started as soon as possible to give the residence of 
Christchurch confidence in the rebuild. As a result the as-built 
information required was developed after some of the early projects have 
been completed and as a result some of the information have not being 
captured correctly. The information captured for each of the pipes on the 
database are shown in Table 7 & Table 8 
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Table 7 example of as-built CCTV database information 
Project 
Number 
Action  SCIRT ID Council ID Status of the 
service 
Pipe type Date laid Pipe 
materials 
11130 No action 177019 14234 In Service Gravity 1/01/1974 RCRRJ 
10314 Removed 90015 53950 Removed Gravity 10/01/1953 uPVC 
        
 







Pipe length Shape 
length 




11130 Company A 150 21.60 21.60 Lining WW 1 3-14 
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10314 Company B 225 22.45 22.39  WW 1 4-11 
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A detailed explanation of the database is as follows: 
Project number 
Each SCIRT project has a unique 5 digit number that is allocated at 
project definition gate (Figure 3 Gated project structure). This unique 
number is recorded in the document control system and is used to track 




This is the action taken by SCIRT as recorded for each individual pipe on 
the database, there are four actions that have been used across the rebuild 
for all pipes and these are as follows: 
 
No Action  
This is used for pipes that have been inspected during the asset 
assessment and have been included in the catchment of a project. These 
pipes have been assessed by the designers in accordance with the 
guidelines and do not meet the criteria for either repair or replacement. 
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Removed  
This is used for pipes that have been removed by SCIRT during the 
rebuild. These pipes have suffered significant earthquake damage and are 
beyond repairing as they have lost their serviceability and therefore 
passed their asset life. Once the individual project is handed back to the 
City Council the pipes that have been identified as being removed by 
SCIRT will also be removed from the asset register.  
 
Repaired  
This is used for pipes that are able to be repaired during the rebuild. The 
techniques used for pipe repairs in SCIRT include pipe lining, segment 
repairs by means of trenchless technology or traditional dig down repairs.  
 
Added  
This is used for new pipes that have been installed during the rebuild 
programme. These pipes are new assets and will be recorded as new on 
the Christchurch City Council’s asset register. There are also instances 
where new pipes have been installed as part of betterment. The agreement 
between Central Government and the Council is that if the Council wants 
to improve the network i.e. increase the pipe size to cater for future 
population growth etc. then the Council would fund the difference 
between the original design and the cost of the new infrastructure. 




SCIRT developed a GIS system and have also created a unique ID for 
each pipe that has been assessed by the design team. This ID is used for 
their own internal systems to identify the pipe. 
 
Council ID 
The Council has their own unique asset ID which is registered on their 
asset database in their internal asset management software. 
 
Status of the service 
The status of the service is the status at the time of the assessment of the 
pipe and includes the following: 
 
Abandoned 
Pipes that have been removed from the asset register by means of filling 
with flow able fill are being recorded as abandoned. This often occurs 
where the existing pipe is below the newly installed pipe. In this instance, 
the existing pipe is not being removed but being filled up with a low 
strength concrete mix. This is to ensure that the existing pipe does not 
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collapse over time and create a void that could lead to pipe failures of the 
newly installed infrastructure. 
 
In service 
A pipe is recorded as in service when it is in need of repair or when no 
action will be taken.  
 
Removed 
Existing pipes that have been removed during the rebuild during the 
excavation where the existing pipe is above the invert level of the new 
pipe, the existing pipe is marked on the database as removed. These pipes 
have been taken to landfill sites. 
 
Pipe type 
Prior to the earthquakes Christchurch had a gravity waste water network, 
in most situations the new installations during the rebuild are gravity, in 
Parklands low pressure is introduced while in Shirley and Aranui vacuum 
is introduced. These are recorded under pipe type. 
 
Date laid 
This is the date the pipe is installed. 




During the rebuild, modern day materials were being used for new pipe 
installs i.e. uPVC, HPDE, Concrete etc. Prior to the earthquakes, the 
network was considered in reasonable condition even though some of the 
materials in the network was outdated and no longer being used i.e. Cast 
Iron, Ductile Iron etc. The materials of the network was recorded on the 
Council’s asset register and made available to SCIRT at the start of the 
rebuild. Pipes being installed during the rebuild was recorded during the 
as-built CCTV programme. 
 
Installation Company 
The installation company is one of the 5 NOPs who was allocated the 
project for construction. Pipe assets with no action recorded would not 
have an installation company name entered against the pipe. 
 
Internal diameter 
The internal diameter of the pipe whether new or existing is being 
recorded. The internal diameter have not always been recorded during the 
as-built process of the rebuild programme and also not always been 
recorded on the Council’s existing asset register. 
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Pipe length 
This field is used for the length of the original pipe installed. 
 
Shape length 
The shape length field in the database is used for recording the length of 
the repair. If a new pipe was installed then the length of the pipe and the 
shape length would be the same length. However if the original pipe was 
repaired by means of a segmental patch repair then the shape length will 
be recorded as the length of the patch. 
 
Treatment 
This is the type of treatment used during the rebuild and include a 
number of pipe rehabilitation methods such as CIPP lining, Spiral 
Wounded lining, uPVC fold and form, slip lined and lined patch. For new 
installation the treatment is recorded as new pipe, while a dig down repair 
is recorded as a new pipe section. 
 
Network 
This is the unique identifier within SCIRT’s comprehensive as-built 
database of all the assets to identify the waste water network within the 
SCIRT database.  
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Liquefaction zone 
The city has been divided into areas based on the liquefaction resistance 
CRR settlements and displacements observed following the earthquakes. 
LRI zone 0 has the lowest CRR value and also experienced the highest 
amount of settlement in access of 500mm with high levels of liquefaction 
being observed, while zone 4 has a higher CRR value and less settlement 
with no liquefaction observed (Cubrinovski, et al., Liquefaction impacts 
on pipe networks, 2011) (see Figure 7) 
 
 
Figure 7 LRI zone at water table depth (Cubrinovski, et al., Liquefaction impacts on pipe 
networks, 2011) 
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Area Label 
At the start of the SCIRT rebuild programme, the city was divided into 
11 main catchments. These catchments were the main identifiers used to 
identify all the assets within each catchment. For each pipe the original 
catchment is recorded and is captured on the as-built database. 
 
Data Analysis 
As-built information of 11,542 line entries of waste water pipes, recorded 
on the database, have been analysed using SPSS version 23. For the 
analyses in this chapter the pipe diameter, design guideline and the 
damaged area have been used. A frequency test has been performed to 
calculate the length of pipes repaired. The pipe sizes have been divided 
into 3 classifications as set out in Table 9 Explanation of the range of 
different pipe sizes for the data analyses. 
 




Small <250mm dia. 
Medium 250mm to 450mm dia. 
Large 450mm dia. to 1600mm dia. 
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Pipe entries in the early stages of the rebuild do not have nominal 
diameter recorded because these fields were not filled in during the field 
verification. These items have been discounted from the analysis. 
 
Figure 8 Length of pipes assessed for the different ranges of pipe sizes
 
From the analyses in Figure 8 Length of pipes assessed for the different 
ranges of pipe sizes the majority of the waste water network i.e. 426km 
out of a total of 517km pipes assessed are small diameter pipes, with a 
small number of man truck sewers that make up the large diameter pipes. 
 
Results 
Pipe damage in each of the liquefaction zones 
For the analysis in Figure 9 the pipe length assessed in each of the LRI 
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during as emergency response under IRMO (Botha & Scheepbouwer, 
2015). Zone 1 has the majority of pipes assessed as it was the worst 
affected area of the city where rebuild works was performed.  
 
 
Figure 9 Pipes assessed in LRI zones 
At the time of research, 306km of pipe have been assessed in the 2 worst 
affected areas where rebuild activities were permitted. This equates to 
approximately 59% of the total of 517km assessed. The pipes in zone 4 is 
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Pipes assessed under each design guideline in the 
liquefaction zones 
 
Figure 10 Pipes assessed for each design guideline in each LRI zone 
 
From the analysis in Figure 10 153km or 31% of the waste water 
network was assessed in accordance with the IRTSG in LRI zone 1. 
Work completed under the IRTSG make up 359km or 72% of the 
completed waste water work designed and constructed up to the end of 
April 2016. 
 
Works completed under DG43B make up 9.5km or 1.9% of the total 
waste water network assessed and completed to date according to the 




































































































































LRI zone and design guidelines
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The focus of the rebuild was on restoring the service to the worst affected 
areas with low liquefaction resistance.  
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Chapter 6 Financial Implication of the design guidelines. 
Introduction 
In order to develop an estimate for the reconstruction of the 
infrastructure, the situation prior and post disaster needs to be compared. 
For the baseline situation, the asset registers from the asset owners are 
used to establish the quantum of infrastructure and its condition. As the 
information from these asset registers is not always up to date, the 
estimate is therefore based on less than perfect information. Immediately 
following the disaster an assessment is required to understand the extent 
of the damage as well as to do an initial estimate of the repair cost. The 
different assets can be assessed in different ways i.e. visual inspections 
for assets such as roads can be inspected from the surface to identify the 
damage. However the deeper assets such as waste water reticulation and 
storm water pipes are more time consuming and costly to assess by using 
CCTV inspection methods.  
 
The analyses in this chapter evaluates the CCTV database as described in 
chapter 4 and compares the financial performance of the design 
guidelines as described in chapter 3. This then provides the information 
of the main objectives of the research to better understand the impact of 
the different design guidelines on the asset life, the repair costs as well as 
the replacement cost. 




Decisions on the cost of rebuilding infrastructure only deal with the direct 
cost of repairing infrastructure and do not include costs such as the 
ongoing operational costs or indirect costs, which can be considerably 
higher than the direct cost (Pelling, Ozerdem, & Barakat, 2002). The 
operational cost is usually the responsibility of the asset owner and or 
local government which could ultimately have a financial implication on 
the end users. 
 
The financial impact of the natural disasters can be divided into direct 
and indirect costs. Rebuilding of damaged infrastructure is the direct cost, 
while the operational cost of maintaining the infrastructure is considered 
to be indirect cost (Ricardo, 1997). The short term period immediately 
following the disaster provides opportunities for investment through 
insurance pay-outs, international relief and development aid, but is 
usually short lived and does not compensate for the secondary losses that 
can be felt for a long time after the disaster (Pelling, Ozerdem, & 
Barakat, 2002). Understanding the financial impact of natural disasters 
will not only help society to understand the magnitude of the disaster but 
also to identify resource that can assist with reducing the consequences of 
disasters (Porfir'ev & Makarova, 2014). 
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Reconstruction provides opportunities to address specific vulnerabilities 
to future disasters through building back better and to boost social and 
economic development. Rebuilding infrastructure often plays an 
important role in sustaining recovery following a major disaster 
(Palliyaguru, Amaratunga, & Haigh, Developing an approach to assess 
the influence of disaster risk reduction practises into infrastructure 
reconstruction on socio-economic development, 2013). Loss of 
infrastructure, together with the loss of lives as a result of a natural 
disaster have significant impacts on the psychological and economic 
impact on communities. It is therefore important that the reconstruction 
of infrastructure projects aim to reduce the vulnerabilities for the 
development of communities through disaster risk reduction (Palliyaguru 
& Dilanthi, Managing disaster risks through quality infrastructure and 
vice versa, post disaster reconstruction practices, 2008). With regards to 
damage to infrastructure, improved planning at design stage can reduce 
losses to more tolerable and affordable levels as well as reducing long-
term costs (Hudson, Cormie, Tufton, & Inglis, 2012) 
Methodology 
For all the analyses in this chapter the pipes that have been installed in 
LRI zones 1 to 4 prior to the start of the CES have been selected and 
evaluated to predict the impact of the design guidelines.  The actions 
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taken by SCIRT on these pipes have been recorded on the database as 
one of three options i.e. no action, removed or repaired. The total length 
of pipes assessed for each action in accordance with each design 
guideline is shown in Figure 11. Pipes in LRI zone 0 have been 
discounted from the financial analyses in this chapter as no rebuild 
activities were permitted in this zone. This is because the properties have 
been bought by the government, demolished but the land has not been 
developed.  
 
Figure 11 Actions taken by SCIRT 
When a pipe has been removed, it has been replaced by another pipe and 
the action for the new pipe is then recorded as added. From the 
information available in the database it is not possible to separate the 
pipes that have been added between betterment and replacement of 
existing pipes as this information is captured on the SCIRT GIS database. 









































































Actions taken per design guideline
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have been removed with the pipes that have been added without the GIS 
database. This is because each pipe entry on the CCTV database has a 
unique asset number that feeds into the Christchurch City Council’s asset 
management software. The link between pipes removed and added are 
established as part of the handover process in SCIRT with the aid of their 
GIS database. The GIS database was not available for this research and 
therefore new pipes that have been added have been excluded from the 
analyses. New pipes that have been installed under each of the design 
guidelines are therefore not shown in Figure 11.  
 
For the data analysis in Figure 12Figure 12 the RUL of each pipe has 
been calculated using the formula in Equation 2: 
 
RUL = standard asset life – age of the asset 
 
Equation 2 Remaining useful life calculation 
For all pipes installed prior to the CES, the standard asset life is based on 
the materials used during the initial installation of the pipes (see Table 10 
Standard asset life for pipe materials for pre and post-earthquake pipe 
installations and repairs). Standard asset life is also sometimes referred 
to as the design life of the asset. (New Zealand Asset Management 
Support, 2006).  
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During the rebuild modern day materials such as concrete and PVC pipes 
have been used for the installation of new gravity waste water pipes. 
Trenchless renewal techniques such as lining were used where the pipe 
had minor damage but did not fail on grade and was in need of repair 
works.  
 
During the rebuild modern day materials such as concrete and PVC pipes 
have been used for the installation of new gravity waste water pipes. 
Trenchless renewal techniques such as lining were used where the pipe 
had minor damage but did not fail on grade and was in need of repair 
works.  
Table 10 Standard asset life for pipe materials for pre and post-earthquake pipe 
installations and repairs (New Zealand Asset Management Support, 2006) 
Pipe material used Standard asset life in 
years 
Asbestos cement 60 
Concrete 60 
Ductile Iron 40 
Polyvinyl Chloride 88 
Repairs including pipe 
lining and patch repairs 
50  
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The standard asset life post rebuild for a new pipe installation is 
determined by the material used, for a repaired pipe it is determined by 
the materials of the host pipe. In the event of no action taken by SCIRT 
the standard asset life was the same as prior to the CES. 
 
 
The age of the assets for pipes installed prior to the earthquakes were 
calculated from the date the pipe was installed up to the 4th of September 
2010. The age of the asset post rebuild has been calculated based on the 
action taken by SCIRT during the rebuild as explained in Table 11 
Different pipe materials have varying number of breaks for the length of 
pipe per year depending on the age of the pipe (Adachi & Singh, 2013). 
The results from the bathtub curves (Adachi & Singh, 2013) were used to 
estimate the number of breaks for each pipe up to the date of the first 
earthquake of the 4th of September 2010. These pipe failure rates were 
also used to predict the number of breaks over the remaining asset life of 
the pipes post rebuild for each pipe. Two common repair methods used 
during the rebuild for repairing pipe breakages are trenchless pipe repairs 
(patch) or segment replacements where a section of the broken pipe is 
replaced by means of traditional “dig down” and replace. For this 
research an estimated section repair cost has been used to estimate the 
predicted repair cost for pre and post-earthquake repairs depending on the 
repair method used. 
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Table 11 Calculating age of asset post rebuild 
Action taken by SCIRT Age of the asset in years 
No Action Number of years from date pipe 
was originally installed up to date 
of research i.e. 2016 
Removed 0 
Repaired Number of years from date of 
repair to date of research i.e. 2016 
 
TOC unit rates for replacing pipes from the SCIRT rebuild programme 
have been used for both pre and post-earthquake replacement costs as 
they are reflective of the ground conditions and construction standards in 
Christchurch. According to (New Zealand Asset Management Support, 
2006) indirect cost such as design, quality assurance and project 
management are spread across the various assets as a percentage. For the 
analysis of the repair and replacement cost only the construction cost has 
been included in the calculation. This is because the indirect structure of 
the SCIRT rebuild programme is different to the traditional Council 
projects due to it being an alliance to accommodate the 3 Limb payment 
model (Botha & Scheepbouwer, 2015). The replacement cost is also 
based on the modern equivalent asset (MEA) method, i.e. using modern 
day materials such as uPVC and Concrete, as described in the New 
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Zealand Infrastructure Asset Valuation and Depreciation Guidelines 
(New Zealand Asset Management Support, 2006). 
 
Data Analysis 
A quantitative analyses was performed comparing the RUL, estimated 
repair and replacement costs for the various design guidelines. The 
results have been compared between pre-and post-earthquake using SPSS 
version 23 to evaluate the financial impact of each of the design 
guidelines on the network. 
 
Results 
Remaining useful life  
From the analysis of pipes installed prior to the earthquakes for each of 
the different design guidelines in Figure 12, the total RUL up to the start 
of the CES was 45.8 years with an estimated 38.8 years RUL post 
rebuild. The Christchurch City Council lost an estimated average of 7 
years of RUL from the city’s gravity waste water pipe network as a result 
of the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES).  
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Figure 12 Remaining useful asset life 
 The IRTSG was introduced at the early stages of the rebuild, with the 
intention of fixing all the damage in the network caused by the CES, it 
did not improve the RUL post rebuild. The pipes installed prior to the 
earthquakes and designed during the rebuild under the IRTSG had a RUL 
of 46.6 years. Post rebuild these pipes have an estimated RUL of 39 years 
with an estimated loss in RUL of 7.6 years. 
 
Designs completed in accordance with the Level of Service (DG43) have 
an average of 44.6 years RUL prior to the earthquakes, with an estimated 
RUL of 38.7 years post rebuild. These pipes have lost an estimated 
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Designs completed under the DG43B design guideline had a useful asset 
life of 37 years prior to the earthquakes compared to 31 years RUL post 
rebuild. These pipes have lost 6 years in useful asset life.  
 
Both the IRTSG and Level of Service (DG43) designs have almost the 
same useful life of 39 and 38.7 years respectively compared to the total 
estimated useful life of 38.8 years of the network. DG43B have an 
estimated 7.8 year useful asset life less than the useful life for the 
network post rebuild.   
 
Estimated cost of repairs 
The estimated repair cost comparison between the design guidelines pre 
and post-earthquake is shown in Figure 14. The total estimated repair 
cost for these pipes up to the start of the CES is $41,8M and is estimated 
to reduce by $10.4M or 25% post rebuild. The Level of Service (DG43) 
designs have an estimated repair cost post rebuild of $22,9M which is a 
reduction of $7,38M or 24%. The DG43B design guideline has an 
estimated pre-earthquake repair cost of $1,2M and $760K post-
earthquake repair cost. This is an estimated 37% reduction in repair cost 
post rebuild. 
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There is also a significant correlation between the pipe materials and the 
cost of the repair works over the useful life of the pipe. According to 
Figure 13  the majority of the pipe materials repaired are AC and RCRRJ 
pipes for each of the design guidelines.  
 
The designs completed under the IRTSG in Figure 13 below includes 
44km of pipes with a combined total of 38.4km of RCRRJ and AC pipes. 
For the Level of service (DG43) designs, these materials make-up a 
combined total of 11km out of a total of 14km of pipes assessed. The 
DG43B design guideline included 0.64km of AC and RCRRJ pipes out 
of a total of 0.74km of pipes assessed. 
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AC pipes is 4.92km or 35% of the total length of pipes assessed under the 
Level of Service (DG43) design guideline. AC pipes is 0.29km or 40% of 
the total pipes assessed under the DG43B design guideline. The large AC 
component of both these design guidelines has a significant influence on 
the estimated cost of repair works for each of the design guidelines. This 
is because of the high failure frequency rate for AC pipes as well as the 
works associated with repairing Asbestos Cement. The repair works 
includes partial replacement of the AC pipe as well as very expensive 
disposal charges for AC contaminated landfill sites.  
 
 
Figure 14 Estimated cost of repair works 
 
The reduction in the RUL of the pipes for each of the design guidelines 
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from Figure 14. This is because the repair cost is calculated based on the 
RUL of the pipe.  
 
Replacement cost 
The replacement cost for each design guidelines is the same pre and post 
disaster as can be seen from Figure 15. This is because the City Council 
has developed the Construction Standard Specifications which covers the 
standards for the installation of new pipes. This standard covers standard 
items such as an approved list materials to be used, back fill requirements 
and reinstatement requirements etc. 
 
 
Figure 15 Predicted replacement cost 
The replacement cost has been calculated on a $/m rate of pipe installed 

































Pre earthquake Post earthquake
100 | P a g e  
 
replaced under each design guideline (see Figure 11) the cost varies 
between the design guideline. The replacement cost for the IRTSG is 
higher than the replacement cost for both the Level of Service (DG43) 
and DG43B design guidelines. This is due to the majority of the work 
completed at the time of the research has been designed under the 
IRTSG, while projects designed under the Level of Service (DG43) and 
DG43B are still in construction. 
 
Discussion 
The analyses exclude new pipe installations, but include pipes that have 
been removed or abandoned and also repaired. The repair works reduced 
the RUL with an estimated 7 years. Both the IRTSG and Level of Service 
(DG43) design guidelines provide the same useful asset life of 39 years 
as the total for the network post rebuild. The DG43B design guideline 
provided the worst useful RUL of 31 years post-earthquakes. 
 
It is estimated that all the design guidelines reduced the repair cost 
between pre and post-earthquake. The repair cost post rebuild have been 
calculated over a reduction in the RUL of the waste water network. To 
assess the impact of the design guidelines on the repair cost a portion of 
the replacement cost also needs to be added to the post-earthquake repair 
cost for a comparison of the impact of the design guidelines. 




The following conclusions from the results of this chapter can be drawn: 
The pipe repair works following the earthquake reduced the RUL with 7 
years. The 2 design guidelines that have been developed in a 
collaborative environment between asset owners and designers provided 
better RUL post-earthquakes.  
 
With the limited amount of data available for DG43B designs at the time 
of research it is inconclusive that this design guideline will offer a saving 
in the repair cost post rebuild. 
 
Improved design guidelines that provided resilience in the design as well 
as the use of modern day materials in the rebuild reduced the estimated 
repair cost of the network post rebuild.  
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Chapter 7 Consolidated conclusions and limitations 
At the start of the rebuild in Christchurch, aftershocks were still 
continuing. The associated risks of earthquake damage to repair works 
combined with the unknown scope of repair works made an alliance an 
ideal procurement model. The SCIRT alliance not only provided an 
opportunity to share in the risk but also created a collaborative 
environment where the designers, asset owners and contractors can work 
together to reduce risk by having constructability advice available 
through ECI.  
 
The waste water repair works is estimated to be 65% of the total cost of 
the infrastructure rebuild, so any changes to the waste water design 
guidelines could have a significant impact on the financial performance 
of the projects and ultimately on the rebuild programme. ECI input 
during the initial (transition and steady state) periods provided 
constructability advice during the design phase based on the latest design 
guideline. This ensured that the TOC development was well informed 
and always based on the latest design guideline. As a result of this, the 
financial performance of the projects themselves was not influenced by 
any changes to the design guidelines. ECI input proved to assist in 
improving the financial performance of the programme. 
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Waste water design guidelines used prior to the earthquakes in 
Christchurch had little requirements for earthquake resilience in the 
design. The initial focus of the rebuild programme in Christchurch was to 
restore service to the worst affected areas where no service was available 
immediately following the earthquakes. This required a design guideline 
that would restore service and also increase the resilience within the 
network. As the pipe investigations continued into areas with lesser 
earthquake damage a better understanding of the performance of the 
existing network in various parts of the city was developed. In zones with 
high liquefaction resistance the damage to the waste water network was 
significantly less.  Within the collaborative environment the design 
requirements were adjusted to accommodate different levels of damage 
within the existing network. The amendments to the IRTSG and the LOS 
(DG43B) design guideline were developed within the collaborative 
environment created by the IST. These guidelines were developed by the 
designers and implemented once approved by SSC, these changes were 
done based on reviewing the CCTV results as well as input from the 
estimating team. Both these design guidelines provided an RUL of 39 
years which is higher than the DG43B design guideline. 
 
As the investigations continued west into the lesser affected areas, a 
better understanding of the performance of different pipe materials was 
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developed. The network provided more resilience in areas with lesser 
ground movement and liquefaction. 
 
This research is limited to works completed and handed over the City 
Council up to the end of April 2016, with 8 months of as-built data still 
outstanding. The financial impact of the repair works is limited to the 
impact of repairs and trenchless pipe lining. 
 
The current research does not include future effects of earthquakes in the 
estimates of the financial impacts post rebuild.  
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Chapter 8 Contributions and recommendations for future 
research 
Chapter 7 highlights the conclusions from the research for this thesis. 
Further this chapter recommends further research to assist asset owners in 
preparing for possible natural disasters from lessons learnt during the 
Christchurch rebuild.  
 
Recommendations for future research 
It is recommended that the analyses be repeated once all the projects have 
been completed and handed over the Council to understand the full split 
of work performed under each design guideline. For this analysis the 
installation of new pipes should be included for the full financial impact 
of the design guidelines. 
 
It is further also recommended that the effect of earthquakes be included 
in the post rebuild analyses to understand the level of resilience provided 
by the design guidelines. 
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